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Abstract
"The future of the Balkans lies within the European Union" - this is the central sentence of the
European Council conclusions adopted at the Thessaloniki Summit in 2003. Today, almost two
decades later, the Western Balkans are even further away from that goal. After mass membership
in 2004, then Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, and finally Croatia in 2013, the EU obviously looks
tired. Montenegro has entered the the twelve yearstenth year of negotiations, and the results are
still halfway through. Serbia is experiencing the same fate. And other Western Balkan countries
have been on "waiting tracks" for decades.
Fulfillment of basic conditions for membership such as - stable democratic institutions, rule of
law, respect for human and minority rights, functioning market economy, competitive capacities,
etc. - seems to be stagnant. In much of the Western Balkans economies have remained
underdeveloped, dependent on aid, loans and remittances, and prone to high levels of state
intervention.
No new memberships are expected to occur in the near future. All this creates depression in the
region with many accompanying risks. In these conditions, the region should think about
possible alternatives for speeding up the integration process, which would not be in conflict with
the existing compatibility of the European integration process. Could it be the European
Economic Area, assisted by the Berlin Process, Open Balkans (Mini-Schengen), CEFTA, etc.?
During this paper we will use especially the methods of analysis, synthesis, comparison and
history.
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INTRODUCTION
The EU is the natural destination for the six Western Balkans countries that are still outside the
Union - Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia.
And their path towards European integration - at varying speeds according to each case - will be
defined and determined by a series of political, economic, social and institutional reforms set
down by the European Commission in its “EU-Western Balkans Strategy” from 2018. Very
often, it is not so easy to implement the acquis communautaire, without the influence of the
Eropean Union, that is, unless the Union itself provides clear and tangible incentives to do so
(see, Trauner, 2009, p.3).
The Balkans is a European and global neuralgic point, which has been witnessed in the past.
Therefore, pacifying this region means preserving regional and world peace. The Western
Balkans has to create a common market, a common economic whole, a common energy policy, a
common policy in telecommunications, transport, all of which would be complemented by the
development of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Realistically, Western Balkans has
been pushing for more significant trade integration through CEFTA for years, but obviously the
work is going very slowly. This free trade agreement works between all Western Balkan
countries and Moldova, but the expected effects are not sufficient.
The six Western Balkan countries are at different stages of the EU integration process. Serbia
and Montenegro are in the negotiation process, Northern Macedonia and Albania have received
the date of negotiations, but new obstacles are emerging. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a
candidates, while Kosovo is still at an early stage. But the fact is that the Western Balkans
integrative process has significant delays compared to Bulgaria and Romania. All the indications,
in particular the great internal divergences around this issue show that the EU is tired of
expanding with new member states. This directly affects the Western Balkan countries, which
will need many years to negotiate with the new EU membership negotiation methodology. This
could lead to collective outbursts in this region, but also to increased geopolitical appetites of
other countries, such as Russia and China.
This region is more than ever faced with two choices: cooperation and integration in the face of
conflict and war. Hence the need for some "new Schumann plan", since then French Foreign
Minister Robert Schumann's 1950 statement is relevant also to today's political situation in the
Western Balkans. The Multi-annual Action Plan for a Regional Economic Area in the Western
Balkans puts forward a structured agenda for regional economic integration, along the lines
proposed by the Leader’s Meeting, namely: promoting further trade integration, introducing a
dynamic regional investment space, facilitating regional mobility and creating a digital
integration agenda.
The lack of economic cohesion, the high rate of the “grey economy”, the slow democratic
transition process and the ethnical nationalism have all been identified as obstacles for efficient

regional cooperation. The EU attempts of promoting stability and regional co-operation have
only had partial success. The regional co-operation will have a limited effect in a long-term
period if the countries that in fact are the biggest source of instability and conflicts in the region
are excluded.
From the practice so far, it can be concluded that the EU has neither got sufficient power to
induce democratization, nor to build states. While it has developed a comprehensive approach
for democracy promotion, but to the EU lacks a clear strategy for state-building in the first place.
It is positive that the EU supported the conviction in the region that the rule of law should be
understood as the “foundation upon which every other dimension of democratic quality
ultimately rests” (Magen and Morlino, 2008, p.7). The EU encouraged rule adoption in justice
and home affairs by including the respective rules and “by emphasizing their link to the
country’s rapprochement with the Union” (Trauner, 2009,p. 20).

Security and Regional Co-operations
Initiating of the process of regional co-operation is not at all a simple task and it remains to be a
challenge. The last Western Balkan wars have greatly affected the internal economies of the
Balkan countries, the international trade, and in some cases social and political international
cooperation. There are several official regional initiatives concerning the Balkans: CEFTA 2006,
Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI),
Energy Community, South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) and many other official
and unofficial initiatives. All these are aimed towards postconflict consolidation, reconciliation
and integration of the eponymous region to the Euro-Atlantic structures (see, Alcaro, 2010, p.1) .
The EU attempts of promoting stability and regional co-operation have only had partial success.
EU had success only in the use of its economic and political capacities in its purpose to
encourage the domestic reforms. In this way, the EU probably succeeded less than NATO in
overcoming the bilateral character of its relations with the Western Balkan countries and in
encouraging multilateral regional form of co-operation. In any case the role of the Alliance was
not only to defend its members but to “contribute to peace and stability on a global scale through
the development of partnerships and through peace and stabilization operations” (Wioeniewski,
Bartosz, 2010, p.16). One of the promotion modes of this kind of co-operation can be the use of
the channels that are open to bilateral agreements and the assistance program, in order to
promote the multilateral inter-border co-operation in the areas of economic development
infrastructure, transportation, ecology, and crime prevention. On a military-political level, what
should be emphasized are the modes that the new “common European defence” can use in
promoting the regional co-operation in the Western Balkans by involving aspirants in various
educational programs of the European Union (Ringsmose, 2011, p.15).

The Alliance can provide a great amount of financial support for its members and PfP/EAPC
activities in the region and to encourage the dialogue about the security non-military aspects
(such as the economic and cross-borders co-operation, and thus contributing to decreasing
ethnical tensions). Also, the Alliance can contribute to “a bigger practical support in establishing
and implementing bilateral and regional measures of building trust and cooperation”
(Nikodinovska, Stefanovska, 2012, p.47). The New Strategic Concept of NATO is informing the
world about why the Alliance “is still vital and vigorous” (Ringsmose, 2011, p.7).
In this context, Pridham thinks that NATO did not enough succeed in developing an efficient
strategy of facing the abovementioned reasons for regional problems, caused by the defects
during the process of democratization and violent nationalism (See, Pridham, 2008, p.56-70). On
the other hand, in the long term the solution about the crises in Western Balkans and the
expansion of the stability throughout the region of South Eastern Europe will “depend on the
development of the democracies, which, according to same standards, will respect human and
minority rights in every single country” (Clark, 2001, p.45).

The Berlin Process
The Berlin process is began with the 2014 Conference of Western Balkan States in Berlin, and
was followed by the 2015 Vienna Summit, the 2016 Paris Summit, the 2017 Trieste Summit, the
2018 London Summit, the 2019 Poznanj Summit, the 2020 Sofia Summit, and the Berlin Summit
(2021).
The goals of the Berlin process were outlined in the Final Declaration by the German Chair in
2014: “To make additional real progress in the reform process, in resolving outstanding bilateral
and internal issues, and in achieving reconciliation within and between the societies in the
region”, as well as to enhance “regional economic cooperation and lay the foundations for
sustainable growth” (Anastasakis, Bennett, Sanfey, 2018, p.1).
Lack of progress in reducing corruption, and improving security and the rule of law in Western
Balkans countries, were seriously affecting the scale and impact of foreign investment in the
region. The creators of the Berlin Process were of the opinion to place greater emphasis on other
issues as well, such as education, entrepreneurship, inequality, and youth development. Under
the Multilateral Action Plan for a Regional Economic Area agreed at the Trieste Summit in 2017,
efforts are to be focused on: (i) promotion of further trade integration; (ii) introduction of a
dynamic regional investment space; (iii) facilitation of regional mobility; and (iv) creation of a
digital integration agenda (see Declaration of the Western Balkan Summit in Trieste, July 13
2017).

European Economic Area
After mass membership in 2004, then Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, and finally Croatia in
2013, the EU seems tired. Montenegro has entered the thirteenth year of talks, and the results are
still halfway through. Serbia is experiencing the same fate. And other Western Balkan countries
have remained on the "waiting track" for decades. No new memberships are expected to occur in
the near future. All this creates depression in the region with many accompanying risks. In these
conditions, the region should think about possible alternatives for speeding up the process, which
would not be in conflict with the existing compatibility of the European integration process.
Could it be the European Economic Area?
It is obvious that Western Balkan countries are all individually very small and economicly
underperforming and they have tight markets and tight markets are inefficient. The market in the
former Yugoslavia was certainly one broader market given the complementarity of production
factors. Today the Western Balkan countries among themselves have approximate a similar level
of development and no West Balkan country can have drastically different sustainable
development from its other neighbors.
Labour mobility within the region was seen as important in order to ensure that the right skills
were available to support the investments undertaken. However, the most damaging mobility has
been the emigration out of the region of the most skilled workers. The large displacement from
the region, in particular of the vital and professional youth, represents a historic handicap for this
part of Europe. In fact there can be no sustainable development without this generation.
The European Economic Area (EEA) brings together the EU Member States and three of the
EFTA States (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway). It was established by the EEA Agreement, an
international agreement which enables these three EFTA States to participate fully in the Single
Market. The objective of the EEA Agreement is to create a homogenous European Economic
Area. All relevant EU legislation in the field of the Single Market is integrated into the EEA
Agreement so that it applies throughout the whole of the EEA, ensuring uniform application of
laws relating to the Single Market. The 27 EU Member States, together with the three EFTA
States - Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, make up the EEA Contracting Parties. For the
Western Balkan countries, membership in the EEA would be like membership in the EU, but
without participation in its institutions.
The membership of the Western Balkan countries in this organization would undoubtedly give to
the region development power. This would not be an alternative to the membership of the
Western Balkan countries in the EU, but a compatible membership process, even speeding up the

accession process. Following the stabilization of the situation in the EU, from the position of
EEA member the accession talks for these countries would be much faster.

Open Balkans (Mini-Schengen)
Diplomats are still wondering what’s behind the initiative of Albania, North Macedonia and
Serbia, who, in October 2019, decided to advance regional cooperation by forming a so-called
“Mini-Schengen” in the Western Balkans. The Prime Minister of Albania Edi Rama have said
that the goal of all three countries was to be part of the European family, “while this family has
its own problems, we can’t be hostages of the past” (BalkanInsight, October 10.2019).
Leaders of Serbia, Albania and North Macedonia have signed a so-called “Mini-Schengen” deal, which,
modelled on the passport-free zone of the EU, envisages free movement of people, goods, capital, and
services among the three countries. Officials of the three countries said they expect all six countries of the
Western Balkans to join the area soon (See BalkanInsight, October 10. 2019). “In a nutshell, the idea is to
create a Balkan version according to the EU model for free-borders” (See Çipa, 2019, p.2).
Common market and customs union in the Western Balkans Six will enable unobstructed flow of goods,
services, capital and highly skilled labour, making the region more attractive for investment and
commerce, accelerating convergence with the EU and bringing prosperity to all its citizens. The aim is to
transform the Region in which goods, services, investments, and skilled people move freely without
tariffs, quotas or other unnecessary barriers. The removal of barriers to regional investment offers the
opportunity for economies of scale, geographically diversified businesses, and an overall more efficient
allocation of resources within a regional market, thereby fostering the integration of companies from the
region in international value chains. The business people in the region readily welcome this idea.

Often, the question is, who would benefit from the Customs Union? Discussions about the
Customs Union very often indicate that it might be most appropriate for Serbia, as it is - of the
countries in the game - the largest exporter. At first glance, judging by the fact that Serbia has a
trade surplus with other countries, it should be most appropriate for it. But it's a narrow view. If
it were different, it would mean that, for example, Germany benefits from much greater use of
the Customs Union in Europe than Greece or Bulgaria. Counting how much a country is suited to
such a union can easily end up in sovereignity and nationalist rhetoric.

Conclusions
1. It seems that in the last decade the EU feels visibly tired of joining new countries. It
seems that in the last decade the EU feels visibly tired of joining new countries. The
regional countries must come to terms with this reality.

2. The lack of progress in reducing corruption and improving security and the rule of law in
the Western Balkan countries has seriously affected the development of these countries.
Now, for the first time in the recent history the countries of the region are able to
recognize the common goals that unites all them. Their main goals is to achieve regional
integration and membership in the European and Euro-Atlantic institutions and
organizations. Key elements for reaching these goals are intergation, democratization,
enforced good neighbour relations and political and economic reforms.
3. The large displacement from the region, in particular of the vital and professional youth,
represents a historic handicap for this part of Europe. In fact there can be no sustainable
development without this generation.Therefore the common market and the customs
union of the Western Balkans would be a salvation for the entire region, which is risking
to be emptied of its populations.
4. Numerous disproportions between member states can be resolved by mutual agreement
balancing the interests of member states. In this context, regional integration and EEA
membership would be a fast train for all countries in the region for their full EU
membership.

References:
-

-

-

Alcaro R. (2010), Combining Realism with Vision Options for NATO’s new Strategic
Concept, Istituto Affari Internazionali, DOCUMENTI IAI 10 | 07 – May.
Anastasakis, O. (2014), Election consolidation in the post-communist Balkans. Progress
and obstacle, Caucasus International 4, no. 4: 15–25.
Anastasakis O., Bennett A., Sanfey P. (July, 2018),The Western Balkans and the Berlin
Process, South East European Studies at Oxford.
Bhagwati J. (2004), In Defense of Globalization, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bjelić P., Radmila D. M., and Ivana P. P. (2016) “Administrative Barriers to Trade as
Predominant Non-Tariff Barriers in the Western Balkans Trade”, International
Conference for International Trade and Investments (ICITI 2016), Conference
Proceedings, University of Mauritius and World Trade Organization, 4-6 September
2013.
Börzel A. T. (2011), When Europeanization Hits Limited Statehood: The Western
Balkans as a Test Case for the Transformative Power of Europe, Social Science Open
Access Repository (SSOAR).
Clark W. (2001), Waging a modern War, Foreign Affairs.
Čehulić L. (2010), „Regional security should be integrated into the new strategic
concept“, Democracy and Security in Southeastern Europe, Volume.1.

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Çipa A. (2019), “Mini Schengen: A Balkan Breakthrough of Political Stund”,
BalkanInsight,
https://balkaninsight.com/2019/12/03/mini-schengen-a-balkanbreakthrough-or-political-stunt/
Gligorov V. (2017), Chellenges to a Custom Union and Common Merket in the Western
Balkans, The Wienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WiiW),15 June 2017,
Retrieved from https://wiiw.ac.at/challenges-to-a-customs-union-and-common-market-inthe-western-balkans-n-227.html
Magen A., Morlino L. (2008), International actors, democratization and the rule of
law. London: Routledge, 1st Edition.
Pridham G. (2008), “Securing fragile democracies in the Balkans: the European
dimension”, Romanian Journal of European Affairs, Volume 8, Number 2, pp.: 56-70.
Ringsmose J., Ryning S. (2011). Tacking Stock of NATO‘s New Strategic Concept in:
NATO’s New Strategic Concept: A Comprehensive Assessment, DIIS: 02, Danish
Institute for International Studies.
Schimmelfennig, F. (2007) “European Regional Organizations, Political Conditionality,
and Democratic Transformation in Eastern Europe”, East European Politics and
Societies 21(1): 126–141.
Stefanovska N. S. (2012), NATO-s New Strategic Concept and Transformation of the
Defense-Security Sector in the Republic of Macedonia, INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE, OHRID, 2012.
Trauner F. (2009), From membership conditionality to policy conditionality: EU
external governance in South Eastern Europe, Journal of European Public Policy (p.774790).
Wioeniewski B. (2010), NATO Member States and New Strategic Concept, Polish
Institute of International Relation.
Zhelyazkova A., Damjanovski I., Nechev Z., Schimmelfennig F. (2018). European
Union Conditionality in the Western Balkans: External Incentives and Europeanisation,
in: Dzankic, Jelena, Soeren Keil and Marko Kmezic (eds.): The Europeanisation of the
Western Balkans. A Failure of EU Conditionality? Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
2018, 15-37.
BalkanInsight, October 10. 2019, https://balkaninsight.com/2019/10/10/albania-northmacedonia-serbia-sign-mini-schengen-declaration/
OECD/CEFTA (2013), Trade in Intermediate Goods and International Supply Chains in
CEFTA,
https://www.oecd.org/south-easteurope/programme/CEFTA%20IP6_Trade%20in%20Intermediate_Web%20and%20Prin
t.pdf
Consolidated MAP (2017). Consolidated Multi-annual Action Plan for a Regional
Economic Area in the Western Balkans Six, https://www.rcc.int/docs/383/multi-annualaction-plan-for-a-regional-economic-area-in-the-western-balkans-six

